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Abstract
We develop and implement a new measure for inequality aversion: two peers
are endowed with identical binary lotteries and the only choice they make
is whether they want to play out the lotteries independently or with perfect
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1 Introduction
The pure self-interest hypothesis of standard economic theory is refuted by an over-
whelming body of evidence from economics and psychology. The respective literature
documents that people typically also have other-regarding preferences that include
concerns for the resources of others as well as for reciprocity and fairness. One of the
most prominent concepts in the literature on other-regarding preferences is inequality
aversion. According to the seminal models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), the utility of an inequality averse agent is increasing in both
the own payo↵ and the equality of the distribution. The prominence of inequality
aversion lies in the fact that it can explain observed behavior, which deviates from
the self-interest hypothesis in many experimental settings. Examples include giving
in dictator games, the rejection of low o↵ers in ultimatum games, as well as the con-
ditional cooperation and punishment of free riders in public good games. Outside
the lab, the degree of inequality aversion might influence individual preferences over
tax deductions, insurance take-up and many more aspects of redistribution.
Despite its prominence, the measurement of inequality aversion is still debated.
While inequality aversion is intuitively appealing and successful in rationalizing ob-
served behavior in the aforementioned games, it is unclear whether it is indeed in-
equality aversion or other considerations that are measured in these settings. For
instance, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) show that a combination of selfishness, e -
ciency concerns, and maximin preferences are su cient to explain behavior in simple
distribution experiments. Inequality aversion is not needed to rationalize behavior
and, moreover, is at odds with several patterns in their data. In a related paper,
Fershtman et al. (2012) conclude that social norms are more successful than inequal-
ity aversion in explaining behavior in dictator and trust games. Thus, decisions in
games that appear to be based on inequality aversion may actually originate from
other preferences. Still, Tricomi et al. (2010) find neural evidence for the existence
of inequality aversion in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Motivated by this literature, the present paper develops and implements a new
method to measure inequality aversion, which we term “coupled lotteries.” In this
method, two players are endowed with two identical binary lotteries (o↵ering amount
x with probability p > 0 and nothing otherwise) and the only choice they make is
whether they want to play out the lotteries independently (“separated”) or with
perfect positive correlation (“coupled”). This choice only a↵ects ex post inequality
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in outcomes, i.e., there is no outcome inequality if lotteries are coupled and a 2p(1 p)
chance of inequality if lotteries are separated. When only monetary payo↵ over both
peers is maximized, not coupling the lotteries is the social planners optimal choice,
because risk could be shared ex post by reallocating payo↵s if one party wins and
the other loses. Since coupling the lotteries decreases the chance of inequality for
sure and changes nothing except the possibility for ex post risk sharing, inequality
aversion seems to be the only way to rationalize this choice.
We implement an incentivized version of our coupled lotteries game in a repre-
sentative survey of about 850 rural households in Ubon Ratchathani, a province in
northeastern Thailand. The advantage of using this survey is, first, that we have
a more heterogeneous sample than lab experiments with students, second, that we
can employ rather high monetary incentives comprising more than a half day’s wage
and, third, that we can use extensive socioeconomic data for each respondent. Thus,
we are able to analyze the share of respondents displaying inequality aversion as well
as which personal and socioeconomic characteristics are associated with inequality
aversion. We test six hypotheses derived from the literature (mainly based on the
structural estimation of Bellemare et al. (2008)): inequality aversion is related to
being male, older, less educated, poorer, showing higher risk aversion, and having
social status concerns. Additionally, we can directly use our measure to explain real-
life behavior: following the theoretical considerations of Friedl et al. (2014), we test
the empirical relation between inequality aversion and insurance take-up. Moreover,
we investigate whether inequality aversion is related to less risky farming decisions.
We find that almost 40 percent of respondents choose to couple the lotteries versus
more than 60 percent who prefer to separate. Regarding the six hypotheses stated
above, our evidence supports three of them (while evidence on the three others is
not robust): choosing coupled lotteries is significantly related to being male, being
more risk averse, and having social status concerns, which is in line with theoretical
predictions. Potential ex post risk sharing (which might motivate to separate) is not
supported by our data, as risk sharing would be related to, for example, trust in
the village. This is not compatible with our results, which show that subjects who
trust more prefer to couple. Finally, we find that households with inequality averse
household heads are more likely to have some kind of formal insurance and are also
more likely to diversify crops (if they are farmers), which is a way to diversify risk
of crop loss. This is in line with theoretical predictions on insurance take-up.
We opt for a lab-in-the-field experiment as we want to take advantage of the
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unique setting: interviews are conducted in each respondent’s house and we let
them each play coupled lotteries against one of their neighbors, who is not part
of the sample. Analyzing inequality aversion within such a close reference group
is rare in the economic literature and gives insights into social preferences when
social distance is small. It might, however, present an upper bound of inequality
aversion (e.g. Bandiera et al., 2005; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Furthermore,
there might be culturally determined di↵erences in the degree of inequality aversion
between our relatively poor Thai sample and samples in industrialized countries (see
Alesina et al., 2011, for a general discussion on preferences for redistribution). Croson
and Gneezy (2009), for example, analyzing various ultimatum and dictator games,
conclude that, in general, women seem to be more inequality averse, which contrasts
with our finding. However, as highlighted before, these games might not be suited for
identifying inequality aversion because they exhibit a trade-o↵ between maximizing
e ciency and inequality aversion. In general, we do not have reason to believe that
the cultural background a↵ects the external validity of our method itself.
To eventually rule out risk sharing motives completely, we additionally imple-
ment our measure in a “more controlled” setting, namely, a lab with students in
Germany. The anonymity and structure of a lab experiment inhibits ex post risk
sharing. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between coupled lotteries and
a still common measure for inequality aversion, the dictator game. We find that
the degree of inequality aversion in the German student sample is larger than in the
Thai rural sample. This is a bit surprising given the high social distance between
lab participants in comparison to neighbors, however, the two samples di↵er in many
respects. Thus, it is comforting that we also find similar results in both samples,
such as coupling being related to risk aversion and that we can confirm that women
are not more inequality averse than men. However, we do not find any correlation
between decisions in the coupled lotteries and the dictator game within this student
population. This is in line with our claim that dictator giving is driven by di↵erent
other-regarding preferences. It also speaks to previous literature that refutes the cor-
relation of inequality aversion parameters derived from the dictator game and other
simple distribution games (see Blanco et al., 2011).
Our paper is closely related to the work of Bellemare et al. (2008) who analyze
inequality aversion in a representative sample of the Dutch population. Based on
observed decisions in the ultimatum game and proposers’ elicited expectations of
rejection rates, they estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty
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from which they derive the degree of inequality aversion. Compared to our method,
they obtain a metric measure about the degree of inequality aversion and are able to
distinguish between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion, while we
only obtain a binary measure, i.e., we can detect whether a person is inequality averse
or not. However, our method has the potential advantage that we do not need to
control for expectations and risk attitudes but can observe inequality aversion directly
from choices. It is much easier to implement this method in large scale surveys and to
obtain a relatively simple, fast, and still valid measure for the presence of inequality
aversion. Furthermore, the game is easy to understand and decreases the concern of
confounding preferences with decision errors.
The reason why Bellemare et al. (2008) use structural modeling lies in the afore-
mentioned di culty of distinguishing inequality aversion from other motives in stan-
dard distribution games. So far, probably the most common ways to measure in-
equality aversion are observing choices in dictator and ultimatum games (see Levitt
and List, 2007). However, the literature shows that these choices can also be ex-
plained by other considerations. In the case of the ultimatum game, first, it is the
fact that giving might depend on the belief a proposer has about the acceptance
threshold of the responder. Already Forsythe et al. (1994) concludes that strategic
considerations partly drive ultimatum giving as people give more in the ultimatum
than in the dictator game. This is confirmed by Bellemare et al. (2008) as their
model controlling for individual beliefs fits observations better than a model assum-
ing rational expectations. On the responder side, rejecting an o↵er can be caused by
inequality aversion but also by negative reciprocity (Brandts and Sola`, 2001; Falk et
al., 2003; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) or other punishment motives. The active role
of the responder and, thereby, the strategic interaction is eliminated in the dictator
game. Here, there is especially one motive that competes with inequality aversion
in explaining observed choices: (impure) altruism. Andreoni and Miller (2002) show
that simple altruistic preferences explain dictator giving extremely well. This work is
extended by, among others, Chowdhury and Jeon (2014) and Korenok et al. (2013),
who find more support for impure altruism as there is imperfect crowding-out if
recipients have own income (Bolton and Katok, 1998). In any case, it is not clear
whether dictators derive a higher utility from equalizing payo↵s, from the warm
glow of giving, or, most likely, from both kinds of motives. This is emphasized by
the finding of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) that a combination of preferences ex-
plains behavior in standard distribution games better than a single social preference.
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Given the previous literature, we approach inequality aversion more directly: we
are not investigating whether inequality aversion can explain behavior in an already
existing game but we are looking for a game that can give us a consistent measure
of inequality aversion.
The design of our game itself is related to a di↵erent kind of distribution games
that address di↵erent correlation structures between the own and the other’s risky
payo↵s, which, however, do not directly address inequality aversion as such. Rohde
and Rohde (2011) concentrate on how correlated payo↵s a↵ect risk taking and give
participants choices between problems with varying risk and correlation structures.
However, neither do these choices resemble our coupled lotteries measures nor are
they suited to test explicitly for inequality aversion. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) and
Adam et al. (2014) use binary decision problems with (perfect) negative correlation
between payo↵s to investigate the e↵ect of social comparison on risk taking. Traut-
mann (2010), relying on binary distribution choices from Broome (1991), discusses
how to include fairness into utilitarian welfare models.
Several paper address the empirical relevance of ex ante and ex post inequality
aversion and how inequality aversion translates to risky environments in general
(e.g. Brock et al., 2013; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010;
Saito, 2013). We deliberately only concentrate on ex post inequality and ignore ex
ante inequality by ruling it out with our design. However, we do not neglect the
existence or the possibly greater empirical relevance of ex ante inequality. Actually,
our results support the notion that exact equality in outcomes does not seem to be
important for many individuals. Given that equalizing payo↵s in our game does not
mean foregoing own payo↵, it would not even be costly to establish equal outcomes
and, still, many persons do not seem to care in both our samples. This is in line
with the aforementioned literature, arguing and showing that inequality aversion in
outcomes is not the main driver for the observed behavior in standard distribution
games. Nevertheless, for some persons exactly equalizing payo↵s does matter and
we can show this is informative about real-life behavior.
Hence, we not only contribute to the literature by deriving a method to mea-
sure inequality aversion in outcomes but also by analyzing who is actually inequality
averse and how inequality aversion is related to economic behavior, like insurance
take-up or crop portfolio choices. The literature on the relation between inequal-
ity aversion and real-life decision making is especially scarce. However, knowing
about areas of life that might be a↵ected by inequality aversion and knowing about
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who is a↵ected is necessary for deriving an empirically validated microfoundation
of inequality aversion. It could inform policy makers thinking about implementing
inequality-reducing policies like progressive taxes or social benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent Section 2
introduces the theoretical background and derives hypotheses. Methods and data
are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 provides results. Section 5 illustrates
the relation between our coupled lotteries measure and insurance take-up. Section 6
discusses the supplemental lab experiment and the additional insight into the relation
between our measure and dictator giving. Robustness checks are shown in Section
7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Coupled Lotteries
Suppose there are two players, i and j, who are both endowed with a lottery L each.
With a probability of p > 0, this lottery yields x and with a probability of 1   p
nothing. The only decision players have to make is whether they want to keep their
lotteries separate, where it is independently drawn for each player if she loses or wins,
or whether they want their lotteries coupled, in which case a single draw determines
if both lose or both win. For simplicity, let us assume that x = 100 and p = 0.5 (see
Figure 1).
[Figure 1 about here]
In standard decision theory, subjects care only about their own payo↵s. There-
fore, they should be indi↵erent between coupling and separating their lotteries, as in
both cases the chance of winning is 50%. One alternative to this pure self-interest
hypothesis is inequality aversion. Like Bellemare et al. (2008), we employ the model
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to model inequality aversion. Suppose that the payo↵s
of i and j are given by xi and xj respectively. Then, the utility of i, Vi , is given by
Vi = xi   ↵imax{xj   xi, 0}   imax{xi   xj, 0} (1)
where 0   i < 1 and ↵i    i. Inequality aversion implies 0 <  i < 1 and ↵i    i.
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For coupling the lotteries, we always have xi = xj. In contrast, when separating,
there is a 2p(1   p) chance of unequal outcomes.1 Given our parametrization this
means, that coupling yields an expected payo↵ of
E(Vi(coupling)) = 50. (2)
Separating entails a 1/4 chance of being better o↵ than the peer as well as another
1/4 chance of being worse o↵ than her. Consequently, we obtain
E(Vi(separating)) = 50  0.25↵i100  0.25 i100, (3)
This means that inequality averse subjects, whose   and ↵ are strictly greater
than 0, should prefer coupling. Note that this conclusion also holds in the case of
risk aversion or any non-linearities in the perception of inequality, i.e. we can replace
Vi in equation (1) also by the more general form:
Vi = ui(xi)  ↵ivi(max{xj   xi, 0})   ivi(max{xi   xj, 0}), (4)
where ui reflects the risk attitude and the strictly increasing vi with vi(0) = 0 reflects
the perception of inequality. Moreover,  i could be even negative, i.e. the subject
actually likes advantageous inequality, as long as its absolute value is less than ↵ (the
parameter for disadvantageous inequality). However, in contrast to Bellemare et al.
(2008), our method does not separate disadvantageous inequality aversion from an
advantageous one.
2.2 Hypotheses
Despite the di↵erences between our method and that of Bellemare et al. (2008), we
believe that both methods measure the same preference. Our initial hypothesis is that
the correlation structure between sociodemographic characteristics and inequality
aversion in our Thai subject pool is similar to that of the Dutch subject pool. Thus,
1 Note, that, independent of coupling or separating, it is always the case that E(xi) = E(xj). That
means there is no inequality in opportunity or ex ante inequality. Subjects who only care about
expected outcomes are hence indi↵erent between coupling and separating. However, subjects who
care about outcome inequality consider the expected di↵erence in outcomes. Therefore, we
apply the expected utility function on Fehr-Schmidt preferences and not Fehr-Schmidt preferences
on expected outcomes. In general, Fehr-Schmidt preferences are not well suited to model ex ante
and ex post fairness for risky outcomes (see Fudenberg and Levine, 2012).
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according to the results of Bellemare et al. (2008), we obtain the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Male subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are more
likely to couple.
In contrast to the previous literature, as for example discussed in Croson and Gneezy
(2009), Bellemare et al. (2008) find no significant sex di↵erence in disadvantageous
inequality (↵), but they find that being male is related to a larger  .
Hypothesis 2: Older subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are more
likely to couple.
Hypothesis 3: Less educated subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they
are more likely to couple.
Hypothesis 4: Poorer subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are more
likely to couple.
In addition to those sociodemographic variables analyzed by Bellemare et al.
(2008), there is evidence that inequality averse subjects are also risk averse (Carlsson
et al., 2005). Thus, we include the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: More risk averse subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they
are more likely to couple.
Furthermore, since social status concerns can be a driver of inequality aversion
(Shaw and Olson, 2012), a measure for social status concerns is included in the
survey. Our last hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 6: Subjects with social status concerns are more inequality averse and,
thus, they are more likely to couple.
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2.3 Alternative Explanations
Ex Post Risk Sharing. For inequality neutral individuals, there is no payo↵
gain in coupling the lotteries. However, in our household-survey-setting there might
be an individual gain in choosing to separate the lotteries due to the possibility
of ex post risk sharing. In fact, separating the lotteries is the optimal choice from
a social planner perspective as payo↵s can be redistributed if one party loses and
the other wins. Since our survey participants live next to each other, it is hard to
control whether they might share the money afterwards as well. We think that it is
a strength of our main analysis that subjects know each other well, implying that
the social comparison should have a much stronger impact than in an anonymous
laboratory setting. Still, we make sure that after introducing the game, subjects had
no opportunity to interact before making their decisions, i.e., they were not able to
agree ex ante on ex post risk sharing. Nevertheless, the possibility of ex post risk
sharing is a potential confound when analyzing inequality aversion with our survey
data. We subsequently address this potential confounding factor by adding variables
to the analysis that help us to detect the possible presence of ex post risk sharing.
Greater trust and social connection between the respondent and her neighbor should
increase the incentive for ex post risk sharing, thereby increasing the probability of
separating. This is because greater trust decreases the level of betrayal aversion
(Bohnet et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010). Bohnet et al. (2008, p. 294)
describe betrayal aversion as being, “less willing to take a risk when the source of
the risk is another person rather than nature.” In our setting nature decides the
outcome of the lottery, but the neighbor decides to share the money afterwards or
not. Thus, she is a source of risk that induces betrayal aversion. In our additional
laboratory experiment (like in any other lab setting), the possibility to share risk
ex post can be ruled out as participants usually do not know each other, cannot
communicate during the session, and leave the laboratory directly after the private
payout. This means that inequality neutral subjects should be indi↵erent between
coupling and separating in the lab.
Reciprocity and Altruism. Even if behavior in experimental games cannot fully
be rationalized by e ciency or maximin preferences, there might be other social pref-
erences that confound the measurement of inequality aversion, e.g. reciprocity and
altruism. Reciprocity is the preference to reward kind and punish unkind actions
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(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In our setting there is no possibility to behave recip-
rocally, since respondents neither can influence their own or the probability of their
neighbors winning nor can they see the choice their neighbors make (and vice versa).
Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, p. 785) define altruism in the behavioral economics
sense “as being costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals.” Ex-
cept for ex post risk sharing, which we discuss extensively in this paper, there is no
scope for altruism in our game.
3 Methodology
3.1 Survey Design
The survey including the coupled lotteries game was conducted in rural Thailand in
2014. It is part of an add-on project to a panel survey in rural Thailand and Vietnam
starting from 2007 that is now known as the Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel
(TVSEP). At the time our game was played, 4 full waves had been completed (2007,
2008, 2010, and 2013).
Each survey wave consists of a household and a village questionnaire. The house-
hold questionnaire is tailored to the lives of families in rural areas, largely engaged in
agricultural business. It includes comprehensive sections on crop farming, livestock
rearing, borrowing/lending as well as saving decisions, health, various socio-economic
items for every household member, and, in particular, questions on exposure to
shocks and anticipated risks. In some waves, personal opinions on topics such as
inequality and trust are sought. The full sample consists of about 4400 rural house-
holds in 440 villages over six provinces in Thailand and Vietnam. It is representative
for the rural populations in these two countries and deliberately excludes households
living in urban areas. The three-stage sampling procedure is described in Hardeweg
et al. (2013).
[Figure 2 and 3 about here]
The add-on aims at analyzing individual risk preferences in rural populations in
more detail, especially how these preferences vary in di↵erent situations and how
they interact with skills like numeracy and financial literacy. The corresponding
questionnaire is substantially shorter than a full TVSEP survey. Furthermore, it
is conducted in only one of the survey provinces in Thailand, Ubon Ratchathani,
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which borders Cambodia and Laos (see Figure 2and 3). The province is located
in the northeastern part of Thailand (“Isan”), which is the poorest region in the
country and where most households engage in agricultural activities. The full sample
comprises about 850 individuals/households.
For most specifications, we combine 2014 and 2013 data, as it results in a richer
dataset and gives us the variables we are mainly interested in. The 2013 data include
measures on trust and social comparison as well as the socio-economic variables we
seek to analyze. We do not exploit the panel structure but include variables that we
assume to be stable over the two points in time. Thus, we specify our regressions
as a one-period model. If we want to exploit information on social comparison
and trust, we can only do so if an individual answered the questionnaires in 2014
and in 2013, because this is personal information that cannot be extrapolated from
the answers of another household member. Unfortunately, some respondents only
answered the 2014 survey. This results in a smaller sample size for some of the
regressions; this subsample consists of 521 individuals. Other variables from 2013,
like sex and education, are available as long as the 2014 respondent was already part
of the household in 2013, which is always the case.2
3.2 Coupled Lotteries in the Field
Coupled lotteries is one of four short “games” played toward the end of the survey.
The preceding section asks respondents to answer a battery of items that measure
their financial literacy. The following and final part of the survey is a quiz to measure
numeracy. Thus, the games are surrounded by two tasks that ask for similar cognitive
and computational skills. However, the financial literacy and numeracy sections are
not designed to assess any sort of preference but are knowledge-based.
Respondents are explicitly asked for consent to participate in the games, which
are not part of the general survey (see Appendix Material A.1). Since none of the
respondents declines to play, no concern for sample selection into the games is given.
In the questionnaire, coupled lotteries is titled “social game” and is played after the
three other games.3 The whole task is incentivized by randomly choosing one game
2 In most cases the respondent in both years is the household head or their spouse.
3 The first is a multiple price list to elicit risk preferences following Holt and Laury (2002), the
second consists of four multiple price lists to elicit time preferences, and the third one is the
“cheating game” by Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013). We have no reason to believe that
these games themselves prime behavior in our game in any specific way. Importantly, the first
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to be implemented for payo↵. On average, respondents earn 165 THB (ca. 3.70e)
including a participation fee of 30 THB (ca. 0.68e), which is more than a half day’s
wage.
Coupled lotteries is played out by gaining either 100 THB or 0 THB, each with
50% probability determined by a coin flip (see Appendix Material A.2). The survey
respondents are assigned the role of player i, which is a trivial assignment as roles are
symmetric. We ask a neighbor of each respondent to join the game as player j. Since
the survey is conducted in small villages with mostly about 100 inhabitants, players
know each other quite well. However, the neighbors are not part of the survey sample
and, therefore, we do not have further data on them.4 The crucial decision that both
players then make is deciding whether their lotteries are played out by one coin flip
for each of them or by one coin flip together. Thus, they have to decide whether
they want their risk to be perfectly positively correlated to or to be independent
of their peer’s risk. As explained before, the expected total payo↵ is equal in both
cases, but the correlation structure changes the relative payo↵. Both participants,
although sitting next to each other, have to indicate their choice secretly on a piece
of paper that is collected by the interviewer who then flips the coin(s) and announces
the outcome (see Appendix Material A.3).5 If both players decide to couple, so that
only one coin is flipped, both either receive 100 THB or nothing. If both decide
to separate, one coin is flipped for each of them and both receive their respective
payo↵, independently from each other. If they have conflicting preferences meaning
one decides to couple and the other to separate, an additional coin is flipped to
determine how the lottery is played out (see again Figure 1). To avoid experimenter
demand e↵ects, we neither encourage nor discourage participants with respect to ex
post risk sharing.
3.3 Empirical Approach
Decisions about coupled lotteries are binary and since every participant makes a
valid choice, we use a simple logit model to estimate our regressions. Let Yi denote
the decision a participant takes, where yi = 0 means separating the lotteries and
two games are only played out after the coupled lotteries game and reported numbers in the
cheating game are uncorrelated to decisions in the coupled lotteries game.
4 Except for four observations, we could always find a neighbor who agreed to participate.
5 As mentioned before the respondent is paid for only one of the games, but the neighbor is paid
directly after the social game has been played.
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yi = 1 means coupling the lotteries. The first regression specification only contains
information available for the full sample and reads as follows:
Yi = ↵ +X
0
it 1 + uit (5)
Errors are clustered on the district level and the regressor matrix X 0it contains sex,
age, education, annual per capita log consumption, district fixed e↵ects, and a mea-
sure for risk preference. We use consumption instead of income because, in general, it
is believed to be a more reliable measure in this kind of setting. However, our results
are also robust to using annual per capita income (see Section 7). As the survey was
designed to analyze risk preferences, various measures of risk taking are available.
These are correlated with each other but seek to measure risk taking behavior in
di↵erent situations. We include risk preference measured through the multiple price
list method (inspired by Holt and Laury, 2002), which is the only incentivized elici-
tation method we employed. Education is measured by years of schooling. In one of
the regressions we include a first measure to test for ex post risk sharing. To do so
a proxy for trust or closeness to people in the village is used. We employ a variable
that indicates whether respondents receive agricultural advice from their neighbors
or relatives.
The second regression specification applies to the subsample of respondents who
played the game in 2014 and answered the survey in 2013:
Yi = ↵ +X
0
it 1 + S
0
it 2 + uit (6)
Besides the same regressor matrix X 0it as in 5, matrix S
0
it is added. S
0
it contains our
measures for social status concerns and a more accurate measure of trust. Respon-
dents are asked whether they compare their standard of living to other persons and
to whom. They can choose between 11 di↵erent reference groups, where one option
is “Neighbors” and another one is “I don’t compare myself to anyone.” We construct
two dummies that equal 1 when respondents choose the respective option and 0 oth-
erwise. Thus, we have a dichotomous measure whether respondents “keep up with
the Joneses” (choose their neighbors as main reference group for social comparison)
and whether respondents care about social status at all. As indicated, respondents
can only choose one reference group. Hence, a 0 in the “neighbor dummy” does not
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mean that respondents do not regard their neighbors for social comparison, but that
neighbors are not their primary group for social comparison. In that sense our other
measure for general social status concerns is cleaner, which is why we primarily focus
on whether respondents compare their standard of living at all in the later analysis.
A 4-point Likert scale measures how much respondents trust other people living in
their village, such that we have a more reliable measure for the possibility of ex post
risk sharing.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the two regression models.
We include respondents between the age of 16 and 85 for the analysis. The descrip-
tives are split by whether the respondent is the same in both waves, 2013 and 2014,
or not. There are two significant di↵erences between the two subsamples, i.e. age
and education. As these two variables are highly correlated in our sample, it is not
surprising that there is a significant di↵erence in education given that there is one
in age. The di↵erence in age can be explained by the fact that the add-on project in
2014 put less priority on interviewing the household head than did the main project
and that other household members are, on average, younger than their head. Never-
theless, the fraction choosing to separate is not significantly di↵erent between those
respondents who only answer the 2014 questionnaire and those who participate in
both 2013 and 2014 (see Appendix Figure A.1). Overall, these statistics indicate
that we can concentrate on the latter subsample and still receive valid results for the
whole sample.
[Table 1 about here]
From the table, it can be seen that the majority prefers to separate. Given the
structure of our sample (more women and small degree of risk aversion), this is not
surprising based on our hypotheses. Around 60% of the respondents are female and
the fraction of women who choose to separate is significantly higher (two-sided t-test,
p ¡ 0.05) than the fraction of men who decide to do so (see Appendix Figure A.2).
Furthermore, the rural Thai population seems, on average, to be more risk seeking
than the Western populations previously studied. Dohmen et al. (2011), for example,
use the same multiple price list in a representative German sample. Not only is the
mean for risk taking higher in the Thai sample, but the whole distribution is skewed
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to the right with a much higher proportion never switching from the lottery to the
safe option (see Appendix Figure A.3). This result is in line with the conclusion
of l’Haridon and Vieider (2019) that, on average, persons in poorer countries are
substantially more risk tolerant than persons in rich countries. Years of schooling
and annual consumption per capita in the Thai rural population are substantially
lower than in samples from industrialized countries. Turning to the social comparison
variables, almost half of the sample states that the main group they are comparing
with are their neighbors. Besides this group, there are around 16% of respondents
who do not compare themselves to anyone. Thus, social comparison motives between
players have an important role in our setting.
4 Results
For each regression, we report average marginal e↵ects (AME). Hence, for each ob-
servation all variables, except the one for which the e↵ect is estimated, are held at
their realized level. The AME is obtained by taking the mean over all individual
marginal e↵ects. Given the many dummy variables, estimating marginal e↵ects at
the means (MEM) would be less meaningful as a dummy value between 0 and 1
cannot be interpreted economically (such as being 80 percent female). Table 2 shows
regression results using model specification 1, i.e. analyzing the full sample based
on equation 5. First, the variables for testing hypothesis 1-5 are included in two
steps and then, in the third regression we add our proxy variable for trust between
neighbors to test for the relevance of ex post risk sharing.
[Table 2 about here]
The highly significant positive e↵ect on being male is in line with hypothesis 1;
on average men are 10 percentage points more likely to couple the lotteries than
women. This e↵ect is in line with Bellemare et al. (2008) but stronger than their co-
e cient for the Dutch population. Consequently, we cannot confirm previous studies
that find women to be more inequality averse than men. One explanation could be
cultural di↵erences; Croson and Gneezy (2009) mention that cultural biases could
cause sex di↵erences in preferences. Still, from this perspective, it may be surprising
that the results in Bellemare et al. (2008) point in the same direction as ours. An-
other explanation could be that, in our game, there is no trade-o↵ between inequality
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and e ciency, as in some previous studies. If men prefer e ciency over inequality,
this does not automatically mean that they are less inequality averse than women.
In general, there might be several confounds in previous studies as to why women
appear to be more inequality averse than men. We do not confirm hypotheses 2, 3
and 4. Age is only significant in regression (1) and the e↵ect goes in the opposite
direction as hypothesized. Education and consumption are never significant. These
insignificances are not related to a possible multicollinearity problem. Preference for
risk taking is significant in the expected direction. The e↵ect size is not as small as
it seems at first glance given that the risk taking variable takes values between 1 and
21. Going from 1 to 21 decreases the probability of coupling the lotteries by over 17
percentage points. Thus, we confirm hypothesis 5, that risk aversion and inequality
aversion are positively related to each other. Another possibility would be that risk
taking is not related to less inequality aversion in general, but to favoring advanta-
geous inequality. In our setting, only choosing to separate can lead to advantageous
inequality and more risk prone individuals might want to get ahead of the Joneses
and are less afraid of falling behind. However, this argument is not supported by our
results for social status concerns (see the following paragraphs). Furthermore, there
is no significant interaction e↵ect between risk and social comparing.
Regarding ex post risk sharing, we clearly find evidence against this alternative
explanation. Respondents who are closer to their neighbors are more likely to couple
lotteries instead of separating and potentially sharing afterwards. This e↵ect is
significant and large.
We now turn to the subsample of 521 individuals for whom we have information
about the importance of social status concerns as well as the improved measure of
trust. In Table 3, we report results using model specification (2), i.e. equation
6. Regression (1) contains the same variables as regression (2) of Table 2 to check
how consistent the model is estimated with the smaller sample. In regressions (2),
(3), and (4) social status and trust variables are added. The e↵ect sizes for sex
are smaller in all presented regressions but are still large and significant. Age and
consumption are insignificant as before, which is intuitive, because possible e↵ects
should have already been significant in the larger sample. For education, however,
we find significant e↵ects. Due to the significant di↵erences in age and education
between the two samples and the small sample size here, we do not want to interpret
this as evidence for a sizable e↵ect of education as stated by hypothesis 3. If there
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is any e↵ect, more educated individuals seem to be more inequality averse, not the
other way around. Unfortunately, the smaller sample size cause the coe cients on
risk taking to become insignificant. Still, they do not di↵er in direction and size from
the full sample specification.
[Table 3 about here]
Looking at the measures for social status concerns, we confirm hypothesis 6. Hav-
ing the neighbors as main reference group for social comparison increases probability
of coupling the lotteries while having no social status concerns decreases the prob-
ability of coupling. The coe cient for having no social status concerns is large and
significant at the 5% level. Moreover, our finding indicates that inequality aversion
seems to be stronger if the other person is part of the individual’s main reference
group for social comparison. We cannot use both variables in the same regression
because a substantial part of the sample compares themselves to neighbors, which
makes the two dummies per definition highly correlated. Therefore, they are included
separately in regressions (2) and (3).
Eventually, we again test for ex post risk sharing, this time using the proxy
from the 2014 survey and adding a more reliable measure on trust from 2013. Both
coe cients depict a sizable e↵ect and are clearly not in favor of ex post risk sharing.
Respondents trusting other people in the village a lot are 16 percentage points more
likely to couple the lotteries than respondents who do not trust other villagers at all.
This is in line with inequality aversion is increasing in reduced social distance and
that the “comparing with neighbors” dummy turns insignificant if the two variables
for trust are added.
5 Inequality Aversion and Field Behavior
In order to test the “predictive power” of our measure for inequality aversion, we
estimate the correlation between the measure and actual behavior that theoretically
should be related to inequality aversion. More precisely, we run regressions to analyze
whether our measure is related to formal insurance take-up as well as means taken
to reduce the risk of grown crop portfolios, which could be regarded as some kind
of informal insurance take-up. Friedl et al. (2014) show theoretically that insurance
take-up reduces inequality among peers facing similar risks as long as risks are not
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perfectly positively correlated between them. Therefore, inequality averse subjects
should be more prone to insurance take-up, which we want to test in our field setting.
Using the TVSEP 2013 survey data, we construct a dummy indicating whether
the household has any kind of voluntary, formal insurance. Furthermore, we run a
regression using the Simpson Index of (crop) Diversification as used in Nguyen et al.
(2017) for the same households; however, only for those households engaged in own
agricultural activities. Crop diversification is interpreted as informal insurance (see
Skoufias, 2003), because it diversifies the risk of crop loss, especially if the additionally
planted crops are less sensitive to weather shocks or pest infestation. Farmers in
Northeastern Thailand traditionally grow glutinous rice, which is also their main
staple. Cassava is a crop that yields similar profit and fulfills the conditions to
diversify crop loss. Therefore, we estimate separate regressions for growing glutinous
rice and cassava to see whether the motives to grow these two di↵er from each other.
Since the decision what risk to insure and which plants to grow are decisions that
are usually made at the household level, and not the individual level, in our setting,
we only include subjects who are supposed to be the main decision maker in their
household, the household heads.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 reports the regression results for di↵erent kinds of insurance take-up. Our
exogenous variable of interest is the decision subjects make in our coupled lotteries
game. Additionally, we include controls that are hypothesized to be decisive for each
specific take-up (see for example Nguyen et al., 2017), in particular our incentivized
measure of risk aversion. As can be seen, respondents who are inequality averse, i.e.
those who couple the lotteries, are significantly more likely to have formal insurance in
their households and to have an above-average crop diversification index. The above-
average diversification seems to be driven by growing cassava which, in contrast to
glutinous rice, is significantly correlated with being inequality averse. Thus, we can
show that our measure captures real-life decisions that are likely driven by inequality
aversion.
6 Supplemental Lab Evidence
To gain further insights, we also ran a lab experiment in Germany including the
coupled lotteries game. Our motivation for this experiment is twofold. First, besides
18
substantially increasing social distance, because lab participants typically do not
know each other, unlike neighbors in a small Thai village, and because participants
in fact do not know who their counterpart for playing the game will be, taking the
game to the lab inhibits ex post risk sharing for the very same reasons. Hence, in
comparison to the field study, our lab experiment is more controlled as we can fully
rule out risk sharing motives. Second, we aim to analyze how decisions in the coupled
lotteries game relate to a common (but flawed) measure for inequality aversion by
additionally playing the dictator game.6
The sessions were conducted at the University of Kiel in March 2019. In total, 76
students participated in 2 sessions. On average the sessions lasted about 35 minutes
and participants earned 13e. Besides a questionnaire, the experiment includes four
games in fixed order, a dictator game, the coupled lotteries game, and two multiple
choice lists eliciting the certainty equivalents of a lottery where you win(lose) 10e or
nothing with equal probabilities. Instructions for the experiment were given on the
screen and in written form (see Appendix Material A.5). Participants were invited
via hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and the experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen
et al., 2016). Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.
[Table 5 about here]
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that in contrast to our rural Thai sample, the
majority of our German student sample couples the lotteries. About 60% decide
to couple the lottery and again the share is statistically significantly di↵erent from
being random. Furthermore, we find no di↵erence for female and male participants,
which might be due to the rather homogeneous student sample in general (see Ap-
pendix Table 6 (1)). Still, we again cannot confirm previous findings, which are also
mostly based on student samples, that women are more inequality averse than men.
We find a significant negative relationship between age and coupling the lotteries,
which is similar to the Thai sample. However, given the small age range and the
rather small sample size, insight into this relationship is limited. Our elicitation of
risk preferences, using a multiple price list similar to the one in Thailand, shows a
significant positive relation between risk aversion and coupling. In comparison to
Thailand, the relation in Germany is stronger and more robust. Moreover, in the
questionnaire, we add a question that asks students whether they regularly receive
6 In our version of the dictator game, both parties decide how much to give to the other party and
a random draw decides whose decision is going to be implemented.
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advice concerning their studies from classmates. This question is chosen to mimic
the agricultural-advice question in our Thai sample. In line with our previous results,
students who regularly receive advice are more likely to couple. Thus, even though
social distance in the lab is ex ante assumed to be higher, this finding supports the
notion that less social distance is related to greater inequality aversion.
[Table 6 about here]
Importantly, we do not find a correlation between decisions in the dictator game
and coupled lotteries. Both separators and couplers keep on average about 6.40e
in the dictator game. For us, this is not worrisome, as the main motivation for this
paper is that the dictator game is a flawed measure for inequality aversion. Dictator
giving is driven by various motives that blur the elicitation of inequality aversion in
outcomes, as the literature shows. Blanco et al. (2011), for example, find no corre-
lation between inequality aversion parameters derived from the dictator game and
other distribution games. Along the same lines, one motive for donating to charities
might be inequality aversion; however, it is probably not the most crucial motive.
Similar to charitable (dictator) giving in the lab, the same various motives might
drive charitable giving in real life. We elicit donation behavior in our questionnaire
and, in fact, we find no evidence for our coupled lotteries measure to be predic-
tive for whether people donate money to charities or not. Dictator giving, however,
is significantly positively related to donating at the extensive margin (see Table 6
(2-3)).
7 Robustness Checks
In order to challenge our main results as shown in Section 4, we perform four kinds
of robustness tests. (i) In a first step we run regressions focusing on the socio-
demographic variables sex and age. (ii) Then, we use di↵erent measures for risk
preference and income. (iii) Subsequently, we change the level for clustering the error
terms from district level to sub-district and village level to see how a less conservative
clustering a↵ects the results. (iv) Finally, we control for additional skills that could
promote ex post risk sharing, namely numeracy and financial literacy.
Socio-demographics. We run regressions separated by sex to check for interac-
tion e↵ects between sex and other independent variables (see Table 7). In the same
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table, we narrow the age group we look at. Beside the estimates in Section 4 for
respondents between 16 and 85 years, we run a regression for respondents aged 18
to 65 separated by using the two measures for social comparison. Looking at the
regressions separated by sex, we do not find new significant results. Risk taking loses
its significance in the small subsamples as before. However, the di↵erent size of the
coe cients indicates that the relation between risk aversion and inequality aversion
is mainly driven by the male respondents. Comparing oneself with neighbors is sig-
nificant for the female sample, however, having no social status concerns is not. For
the male sample it is the other way around, suggesting di↵erent channels between
social status concerns and inequality aversion for women and men in our sample. 7
[Table 7 about here]
The narrowed age group increases the e↵ect of risk taking on the decision: al-
though sample size is small, it turns significant. All other results are unchanged
except for receiving advice from neighbors, which turns insignificant.
Di↵erent measures. In this section, we only report regressions using the full
sample as all findings can be transferred to the sub-sample. Replacing annual con-
sumption per capita with annual income per capita (see Table 8 (1)) does not change
any of the other coe cients. Like consumption, income is not significant. The same
holds true if consumption is replaced by the total value of durable assets the house-
hold of the respondents owns. Thus, we gain no further insights by using di↵erent
measures for income or wealth.
[Table 8 about here]
The alternative risk measures we employ are (i) a question for general risk taking
on a scale from 0-10 (Dohmen et al., 2011) and (ii) a question in which respondents
have to decide how much to invest in a business from a hypothetical lottery prize
of 100,000 THB, where the chance is 50% that the investment is doubled and 50%
that it is halved. These two measures do not have a significant e↵ect on coupling.
Regardless, the multiple price list measure seems to be the more reliable measure
7 Furthermore, there is another di↵erence between female and male respondents. Whereas trust is
positively significant for coupling the lotteries for females, receiving advice from neighbors is no
longer significant; with it the other way around for males.
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given its more detailed scale8 and that the multiple price list resembles our game the
most.
Clustering. So far, we have clustered at the district level following Cameron
and Miller (2015) to cluster at least at the primary sampling unit. They emphasize
that clustering on an even higher aggregated level may frequently more suitable.
However, in our sample, there is no level above district that we can use for clustering.
The only option would be no clustering at all. In that sense our method is the
most conservative way to cluster our sample. Nevertheless, we also run regressions
clustered at subdistrict and village levels (see Table 9). E↵ects remain unchanged
except for sex and receiving advice from neighbors, which lose their significance in the
subsample. This is due to the fact that clustering at a too low level cannot account
for correlated error terms within each district. Another point worth mentioning is
that the number of district clusters is small and that large-sample assumptions might
not hold. However, our main results are robust to re-estimating our regressions using
wild cluster bootstrap (results available upon request).
[Table 9 about here]
Skills. As final check, we add indices potentially indicating the comprehension of
the concept of ex post risk sharing; these indices represent the skills of numeracy and
financial literacy (see Table 10). Numeracy is measured by letting respondents answer
6 standard math equations, which gives us an index taking values between 0 and 6.
A higher value of numeracy is related to an increased probability of coupling the
lotteries and, thus, seems to have a similar e↵ect as education (although education
is only significant in the small sample). This result is not driven by a potential
multicollinearity problem between education and numeracy.
[Table 10 about here]
For financial literacy, two standard questions from the literature (Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2008) and two additionally for this survey designed questions are used. We
find a positive e↵ect on separating, which would be in favor of ex post risk sharing.
However, the coe cient is only significant in the small sample. In order to better
8 In principle, the investment question allows for a more precise measurement because respondents
can choose any integer value between 0 and 100,000. Nevertheless, respondents only made 22
unique choices, with more than 50% of the sample choosing 50,000.
22
understand potential drivers, we analyze the four items defining the financial literacy
index separately. We see that the e↵ect is purely driven by answering the question
on inflation correctly, the other questions are not significant. Thus, this might be an
artifact of the small sample.
8 Conclusion
Inequality aversion is a well-established concept in the behavioral economics litera-
ture, which is also gaining policy relevance due to increasing income inequality in
most industrialized countries (Alvaredo et al., 2017). Thus, for sound and evidence-
based policy making, it is important to have a better, empirically substantiated,
understanding of individual inequality aversion. This is currently hampered by the
lack of a simple measure for inequality aversion that can be integrated into large
household surveys. Here we propose such a new and simple measure. Due to its
simplicity, it is less informative than a measure specified by theoretical models, but
has the advantages that (i) it requires no further assumptions on expectations and
preferences and (ii) can be implemented at relatively little cost in empirical studies.
We term this new measure “coupled lotteries.” It is built on a single decision
of individuals; whether they want to separate or couple a predefined lottery with
their peers. Here, coupling means that the lotteries of two individuals are perfectly
positively correlated, i.e. both receive the same outcome. As expected payo↵s are the
same for both choices, the decision for coupled lotteries reveals inequality aversion.
We find, in our sample of 850 poor households from rural Thailand, that about
60% of respondents prefer to separate, whereas 40% prefer to couple. As theoretically
expected, the latter choice is related to being more risk averse and having social
status concerns. In contrast to previous studies, but in line with Bellemare et al.
(2008), our results suggest that men are more inequality averse than women and that
previous studies might include confounding factors. As a competing explanation of
the findings, one may argue that those individuals who prefer to separate are aware
of the possibility of ex post risk sharing. However, we examine several variables
underlying such awareness and expectation, with none supporting this explanation.
In addition to these results, we find that our measure is related to real-life choices.
Household heads who are inequality averse are more likely to have formal insurance
for their household and more likely to diversify the crops they cultivate, which can
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be interpreted as a kind of informal insurance.
Our supplemental lab evidence from Germany shows that coupled lotteries and
dictator game decisions are not correlated, providing further evidence that dictator
and charitable giving are not reliable measures for inequality aversion. Otherwise,
we find similar correlations in our German student sample to those we find in our
rural Thai sample. Social connectivity seems to be an especially important correlate
of inequality aversion in both samples.
Thus, we conclude that our method gives us a robust measure of inequality aver-
sion within our two diverse samples. Future research is needed to show whether this
finding has further external validity and holds with various parameterizations.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Full Sample 2013 and 2014 Only 2014 Di↵erence
Coupling 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.03
Male 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.05
Age 52.97 55.24 49.40  5.84⇤⇤⇤
Years of Schooling 5.94 5.48 6.66 1.18⇤⇤⇤
Ann. Consumption per Cap. 716.57 724.36 703.43  20.92
Risk Taking, MPL 11.03 10.98 11.11 0.13
Advice from Neighbor 0.14 0.14 0.13  0.02
Trust in Village 3.12
Comparing with Neighbors 0.48
Not Comparing 0.16
Observations 851 521 330 851
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2: Logistic Regressions, Full Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.101⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Age  0.002⇤⇤  0.001  0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.015  0.013
(0.026) (0.025)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.004⇤  0.004⇤  0.004⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Advice from Neighbor 0.075⇤
(0.039)
Observations 849 829 829
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.369 0.367 0.367
McFaddens R-squared 0.046 0.046 0.048
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE
clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3: Logistic Regressions, Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.067⇤ 0.068⇤ 0.071⇤⇤ 0.068⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Age  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.015⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤ 0.013⇤ 0.013⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.031  0.033  0.035  0.032
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparing with Neighbors 0.060⇤
(0.036)
Not Comparing  0.127⇤⇤  0.129⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.045)
Advice from Neighbor 0.086⇤
(0.048)
Trust in Village 0.059⇤⇤
(0.025)
Observations 521 521 521 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.044 0.047 0.052 0.061
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE
clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Logistic Regressions, Insurance Demand and Crop Diversity
Having
Insurance
Above Mean
Crop Index
Glutinous
Rice Cassava
Inequality Aversion 0.066⇤⇤ 0.102⇤  0.078 0.086⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.060) (0.054) (0.046)
Male  0.038  0.002 0.022 0.000
(0.032) (0.084) (0.053) (0.048)
Age 0.003 0.002  0.001  0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.013  0.001  0.008  0.001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) 0.079⇤⇤⇤  0.047 0.043  0.056
(0.028) (0.056) (0.033) (0.043)
Household nucleus size 0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.013 0.017  0.016
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.000  0.000 0.001  0.006⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Numeracy  0.002 0.017 0.007  0.017
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Financial Literacy 0.009  0.005  0.012 0.000
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.017)
Self-Employed 0.070
(0.075)
HH better o↵ in 5 years  0.038⇤
(0.021)
Number Anticipated Risks  0.007
(0.009)
Number Weather Risks 0.018 0.026 0.018
(0.036) (0.022) (0.019)
Land Size 0.005 0.007⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Number of Tractors 0.091⇤ 0.092⇤⇤⇤  0.014
(0.048) (0.032) (0.045)
Number of Waterpumps  0.021  0.017  0.070⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 418 319 296 288
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.767 0.537 0.774 0.217
McFaddens R-squared 0.123 0.080 0.193 0.334
Dependent Var.: Having insurance, Simpson index of crop-land share diversification above mean
and growing glutinous rice and cassava. Average marginal e↵ects reported. District dummies not
reported. SE clustered at district level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Lab-Sample
Full Lab-Sample Separators Couplers Di↵erence
Male 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.05
Age 24.61 25.68 23.87 1.81⇤
Risk Taking, MPL 10.46 11.16 9.98 1.18
Advice from Classmate 0.51 0.45 0.56  0.10
Dictator Keeping 6.41 6.39 6.43  0.05
Donation Dummy 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.06
Donation Amount 45.11 38.90 49.38  10.47
Observations 76 31 45 76
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: Regressions, Lab Sample
Coupling Donating Donating
Male  0.042 0.075 0.051
(0.072) (0.119) (0.144)
Age  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤  0.024⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.009) (0.003)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.013⇤⇤
(0.005)
Advice from Classmates 0.081⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
Dictator Keeping 0.012  0.034⇤
(0.025) (0.015)
Inequality Aversion  0.035
(0.288)
Relative Income  0.084  0.082
(0.060) (0.071)
Compare Performance 0.260⇤⇤⇤ 0.239⇤
(0.044) (0.124)
Happiness 0.089 0.084
(0.103) (0.122)
Observations 76 76 76
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.592 0.645 0.645
McFaddens R-squared 0.050 0.098 0.084
Dependent Var.: Coupling - Decision to separate (=0) or to couple (=1); Donating - Dummy for
making donations to any charity; Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE bootstrapped and clustered
at session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Logistic Regressions, Split by Sex and Narrower Age Group
Female Male Age 18-65 Age 18-65
Male 0.085⇤⇤ 0.089⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.038)
Age  0.000  0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.015 0.018 0.017⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.027  0.056  0.027  0.029
(0.034) (0.056) (0.033) (0.034)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.001  0.007  0.006⇤⇤  0.006⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Comparing with Neighbors 0.080⇤ 0.014
(0.048) (0.040)
Not Comparing  0.261⇤⇤  0.104⇤⇤
(0.078) (0.046)
Advice from Neighbor  0.017  0.016
(0.032) (0.034)
Trust in Village 0.067⇤⇤ 0.066⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.029)
Observations 341 178 414 414
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.343 0.382 0.353 0.353
McFaddens R-squared 0.064 0.095 0.067 0.072
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE
clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Logistic Regressions, Di↵erent Measures for Risk and Income
Ann. Inc. Dur. Assets Risk Invest
Male 0.097⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.016  0.016
(0.026) (0.026)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.004⇤  0.004⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002)
Ann. Income per Capita  0.000
(0.000)
Assets Value 0.000
(0.000)
General Risk Taking  0.003
(0.008)
Hypothetical Investment  0.000
(0.000)
Observations 829 829 828 828
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.367
McFaddens R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.043
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE
clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9: Logistic Regressions, Di↵erent Levels for Clustering
Subdistr. Subdistr. Village Village
Male 0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.067 0.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.067
(0.034) (0.045) (0.035) (0.045)
Age  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.005 0.013⇤ 0.005 0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.013  0.032  0.013  0.032
(0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.004⇤  0.004  0.004  0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Advice from Neighbor 0.075⇤ 0.086 0.075⇤ 0.086
(0.046) (0.055) (0.044) (0.057)
Not Comparing  0.129⇤⇤  0.129⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.053)
Trust in Village 0.059⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.029)
Observations 829 521 829 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.359 0.367 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.048 0.061 0.048 0.061
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported.
District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10: Logistic Regressions, Numeracy and Financial Literacy
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.095⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤ 0.066⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.034) (0.030)
Age  0.001  0.001  0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.003 0.012⇤ 0.013⇤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log)  0.014  0.032  0.029
(0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
Risk Taking, MPL  0.004⇤  0.004  0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Advice from Neighbor 0.081⇤⇤ 0.084⇤ 0.097⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.048) (0.047)
Not Comparing  0.127⇤⇤⇤  0.127⇤⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.046)
Trust in Village 0.057⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.027)
Numeracy 0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.013 0.016
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Financial Literacy  0.011  0.029⇤
(0.013) (0.017)
Inflation  0.124⇤⇤
(0.052)
Interest Rates 0.007
(0.038)
Expected Utility 0.018
(0.040)
Loan Conditions  0.023
(0.037)
Observations 829 521 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.359 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.052 0.064 0.074
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal e↵ects reported. SE
clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B Material
Material A.1: Introductory Statement for the Games Section of the Survey
Material A.2: Instructions for Coupled Lotteries in the Survey
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Material A.3: Decision Sheets for Respondent and Neighbor
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Material A.4: Instructions for Dictator Game in the Lab
[Translation:] Decision 1
The computer will match you to a random person in this room and randomly assign you to the
roles of person A or B. The matching and assignment of roles will be kept anonymous.
The setup: Person A will be asked to distribute 10e between herself/himself and person B. Each
amount between 0 and 10e is possible.
You have to decide now as person A how much of these 10e you want to keep. The remain-
ing amount is paid to person B.
Please note that even though you make the decision as person A now, it might happen that the
computer assigns you the role of person B:
If you were assigned the role of person A, you will receive the amount that you assigned to person
A and the other person in the room who is matched to you receives the amount you assigned to
person B.
If you were assigned the role of person B, you will receive the amount that the other person in
the room who is matched to you assigned to person B.
How much do you want to keep as person A?
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Material A.5: Instructions for Coupled Lotteries in the Lab
[Translation:] Coupling of Payo↵s
Again, the computer will match you to a random person in this room and randomly assign you
to the roles of person A or B. Please note that this matching is a completely new (and random)
matching. Matching and assignment are again anonymous.
The setup: A virtual coin flip will decide whether you will gain 10e or nothing. This means,
you have a 50:50 chance to win 10e. Person B is in the same situation. Both of you have to decide
now whether you take the chance to win together or alone. “Together” means a single coin flip will
decide for both of you if EACH of you will win 10e or nothing respectively. “Alone” means that
two independent coin flips will decide for each of you separately whether you will win 10e or nothing.
Please note that the roles of person A and B are exactly the same here.
If you decide unanimously, this decision will be implemented.
If you decide di↵erently, there will be a third coin flip deciding whether it will be played alone
or together.
Do you want to play alone or together with person B?
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Material A.6: Multiple Price List for Gains - Lab Experiment
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Material A.7: Questionnaire - Lab Experiment
What is your sex? 
x Male 
x Female 
What is your age?  
       ___ years 
What is your body-height? 
       ___ cm 
What is your body-weight? 
       ___ kg 
 
Are you a person who rather avoids risks or are you rather willing to take risks? 
x Mostly avoid risks 
x Rather avoid risks 
x Rather willing to take risks 
x Mostly willing to take risks 
 
Do you frequently take advice from other students, if you have to make decisions regarding your studies? 
x Yes 
x No 
How many persons are so close to you that you can count on them if you are in serious trouble (e.g. illness, 
lovesickness, stress)? 
x No one 
x 1 or 2 
x 3 - 5 
x 6 or more 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful when dealing 
with people? 
x Most people can be trusted 
x You can’t be too careful when dealing with people 
 
Do you frequently compare your qualities or performance with other persons? 
x Yes 
x No 
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How happy are you with your life in general? 
x Very unhappy 
x Rather unhappy 
x Rather happy 
x Very happy 
How much money do you have available each month in comparison to other students? 
x Much less 
x A little bit less 
x About the same 
x A little bit more 
x Much more 
 
And now a question about your donations. We understand donations here as giving money for social, church, 
cultural, community, and charitable aims, without receiving any direct compensation in return. These donations 
can be large sums of money but also smaller sums, for example, the change one puts into a collection box. We also 
count church offerings. Did you donate money last year, in 2017 – not counting membership fees? 
x Yes 
x No 
If yes: How high was the total sum of money that you donated last year? 
       ___ Euro 
 
Suppose you put 100€ into your savings account. The interest rate is 2% per year and you leave this money on your 
account for 5 years. What do you think: how much money would be in the account after 5 years? 
x More than 102€ 
x Exactly 102€ 
x Less than 102€ 
x Don’t know 
Suppose the interest rate on your savings account is 1% per year, and the inflation rate per year is 2%. What do 
you think: after 1 year, can you buy the same, more or less than today? 
x More 
x Exactly the same 
x Less 
x Don’t know 
Is the following statement true or false?  
“Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. “ 
x True 
x False 
x Don’t know 
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C Description of Independent Variables
Male Sex of respondent, 0=Female, 1=Male
Age Age of respondent in years
Years of Schooling Years respondent went to school
Ann. Consumption
per Cap. (log)
Log annual consumption per capita in Thai Baht
Ann. Income per
Capity
Annual household income in 2013 USD
Assets Value Total value of all durable goods in the household in THB
Risk Taking, MPL Risk preference measured via Multiple price list method, variable
indicates the switching row from the lottery to the safe amount,
rows from “1”-“21(Never)”. The lottery gives 300 THB with 50%
chance and 0 THB with 50% chance, the safe amount increases
gradually from 0 to 190 THB.
General Risk Taking Answer to “Are you generally a person who is willing to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risk?”, from 0-“Fully unwilling to
take risks” to 10-“Fully willing to take risks”
Hypothetical
Investment
Amount of money respondents would invest if they would win
100,000 THB and the chance is 50% that the investment is doubled
and 50% that it is halved
Comparing with
Neighbors
Dummy for neighbors being the main reference group respondents
compare their standard of living with
Not Comparing Dummy for not comparing oneself’s standard of living to other
persons
Advice from Neigh-
bor
Dummy whether respondents take agricultural advice from neigh-
bors/relatives
Trust in Village Believe in trustworthiness of other persons in the own village from
1-“Trust them not at all”to 4-“Trust them a lot”
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Numeracy Counts the number of right answers to following questions:
1 What is 45 + 72?
2 You have 4 friends and you want to give each friend 4 sweets. How
many sweets do you need?
3 What is 5% of 200?
4 You want to buy a bag of rice that costs 270 Baht, but you only
have one 1000 Baht note. How much change will you get back?
5 In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale,
a mattress costs 3000 Baht. How much will the mattress cost in
the sale?
6 A second-hand motorbike dealer is selling a motorbike for 12000
Baht. His is two thirds of what a new motorbike costs new. How
much did the new motorbike cost?
Financial Literacy Counts the number of right answers to following questions:
Interest Rates If today you borrow 10,000 THB, at an interest rate of 2% per
month, after 3 months how much do you owe totally (principle +
interest)?
Less than 10,200 THB
More than 10,200 THB
Exactly 10,200 THB
Inflation If you have 10,000 THB in an account, the interest rate on the
account is 10% per year, and during this time, the price of goods
and services rises by 12% per year, after one year you can buy:
Less than you can buy today
More than you can buy today
Exactly the same as today
Expected Utility For the same amount of money, a person can enter either one
these two lotteries. Lottery A pays a prize of 2,000 THB, and
the chance of winning is 5%. Lottery B pays a prize of 100 THB,
and the chance of winning is 10%. Which Lottery pays the higher
expected amount?
Lottery A
Lottery B
Two lotteries pay the same expected amount
Loan Conditions Suppose you need to borrow 50,000 THB. Two people o↵er you
two di↵erent loans, the first loan you have to pay back 60,000 THB
in one month, with the second loan you have to pay back 50,000
THB plus 15% in one month. Which loan is the better option?
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Household
Nucleus Size
Number of persons living in the household for most time of the
year
Self-Employed Dummy whether the household head is self-employed including
being engaged in agriculture
HH better o↵
in 5 years
Answer to “Do you think your household will be better o↵ in 5
years?”, from 1-“Much better o↵” to 5-“Much worse o↵”
Number
Anticipated Risks
Number of household risks a household head thinks will occur in
the next 5 years from a predefined list of 17 di↵erent risk plus own
entries possible
Number
Weather Risks
Number of household risks a household head thinks will occur in
the next 5 years that are related to weather
Land Size Size of the area used for cultivating crops in Rai (1600 sqm)
Number of
Tractors
Number of tractors in the household
Number of
Waterpumps
Number of waterpumps in the household
Advice from
Classmate
Dummy whether participants take study advice from classmates
Dictator Keeping Amount of that participant wants to keep in the dictator game.
Can take values between 0 and 10(e).
Relative Income How much disposable money per month participants think they
have in comparison to other students on a scale from 1-“Much
less” to 5-“Much more”
Compare
Performance
Dummy whether participants often compare their attributes and
performance with other persons
Happiness How happy participants are in their lives from 1-“Very unhappy”
to 4-“Very happy”
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